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Abstract: The SAS Educational Value-Added Assessment System (SAS® EVAAS®) is the most 
widely used value-added system in the country. It is also self-proclaimed as “the most robust and 
reliable” system available, with its greatest benefit to help educators improve their teaching practices. 
This study critically examined the effects of SAS® EVAAS® as experienced by teachers, in one of the 
largest, high-needs urban school districts in the nation – the Houston Independent School District 
(HISD). Using a multiple methods approach, this study critically analyzed retrospective quantitative 
and qualitative data to better comprehend and understand the evidence collected from four teachers 
whose contracts were not renewed in the summer of 2011, in part given their low SAS® EVAAS® 
scores. This study also suggests some intended and unintended effects that seem to be occurring as a 
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result of SAS® EVAAS® implementation in HISD. In addition to issues with reliability, bias, teacher 
attribution, and validity, high-stakes use of SAS® EVAAS® in this district seems to be exacerbating 
unintended effects. 
Keywords: value-added models (VAMs); teacher effectiveness; teacher quality; teacher evaluation; 
accountability. 
 
El SAS Sistema de Evaluación de la Educación  de Valor Agregado (SAS® EVAAS®): Algunos 
efectos intencionales y no intencionales en un sistema escolar urbano de gran tamaño. 
Resumen: El SAS Sistema de Evaluación de la Educación  de Valor Agregado (SAS® EVAAS®) es 
el sistema de valor agregado  más ampliamente utilizado  en el país. También se auto-proclama como 
el sistema disponible “más robusto y fiable",  siendo su mayor beneficio poder ayudar a los 
educadores a mejorar sus prácticas de enseñanza. Las investigadoras de este estudio examinaron los 
efectos de SAS® EVAAS®, experimentado por docentes, en uno de los distritos escolares urbanos 
más grandes y con mayores necesidades educativas  de la nación: el Distrito Escolar Independiente 
de Houston (HISD). A través de  evidencias obtenidas con cuatro docentes cuyos contratos no 
fueron renovados en el verano de 2011, en parte debido a sus bajas puntuaciones en SAS® EVAAS®, 
se detallan algunos de los efectos deseados y no deseados que parecen estar ocurriendo como 
resultado de la aplicación SAS® EVAAS® en HISD. Además de los problemas con la fiabilidad, el 
sesgo, la atribución docente, la validez, el uso de SAS® EVAAS® con consecuencias severas en este 
distrito parece exacerbar los efectos no intencionales. 
Palabras clave: modelos de valor añadido (VAM); eficacia docente; calidad docente; 
evaluación docente; rendición de cuentas. 
 
O SAS Sistema de Avaliação do Valor Agregado Educativo (SAS® EVAAS®): Alguns 
efeitos intencionais e não intencionais em um sistema escolar urbano de grande tamanho. 
Resumo: O SAS Sistema de Avaliação do Valor Agregado Educativo (SAS® EVAAS®) é o 
sistema mais utilizado de valor agregado no país. Também é auto-proclamado como o 
sistema disponível "mais robusto e confiável", sendo seu maior benefício  ajudar  a os educadores 
a melhorar suas práticas de ensino. As pesquisadoras deste estudo examinaram os efeitos da SAS® 
EVAAS®, com professores que tiveram essa experiência em um dos maiores distritos escolares 
urbanos e com maiores necessidades educacionais da nação: o Houston Independent 
School District (HISD). Através de evidencias  obtidas com quatro professores cujos contratos não 
foram renovados no verão de 2011, em parte devido à suas baixas  pontuações em SAS® EVAAS®, 
se analisam os efeitos desejados e indesejados que parecem estar a ocorrer como  resultado da 
aplicação SAS® EVAAS® em HISD. Além dos problemas com a fiabilidade, a polarização, a 
atribuição de ensino, a validade, a utilização de SAS® EVAAS® em avaliações com 
conseqüências severas neste distrito parece exacerbar os efeitos indesejados. 
Palavras-chave: modelos de valor agregado (VAM); eficácia dos professores; qualidade dos 
professores; avaliação de professores; prestação de contas. 
Introduction 
 Since the implementation of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) in 2002, researchers, 
econometricians, and statisticians have explored different analytical methods to document 
students’ academic progress over time, specifically to replace Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) 
measures. More recently, President Obama’s Race to the Top competition (2009) encouraged 
similarly oriented initiatives, contributing over $350 million in federal support (Robelen, 2012) 
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to be allocated to those states that adopt methods to better measure the “value” a teacher 
“adds” to student learning from year to year. 
 In theory, value-added models (VAMs) allow for richer analyses of test score data 
because students are simply followed to assess their learning trajectories from the time they enter 
a teacher’s classroom to the time they leave. In practice, however, these models do not seem to 
work in many of the ways theorized. For example, it still remains uncertain whether teachers are 
accurately classified as contributing to differential gains, whether teachers teaching certain types 
of students (e.g., special education, gifted, and English Language Learners (ELLs)) are fairly 
assessed, and whether teachers are using value-added output to inform instructional 
modifications and improvements (Au, 2010; Eckert & Dabrowski, 2010; Haertel, 2011; Hill, 
Kapitula, & Umland, 2011; Newton, Darling-Hammond, Haertel, & Thomas, 2010; Papay, 2010; 
Rothstein, 2009). In addition, while the implementation and use of VAMs for high-stakes 
purposes is increasing across the country, there lingers a paucity of research evidence to support 
the attachment of significant consequences to value-added output (Braun, 2005; Harris, 2011; 
Ho, Lewis, & Farris 2009; Schochet & Chiang, 2010).  
 The purpose of this study was to contribute to the existing research base by critcally 
examining some intended and unintended effects of the largest and most commonly used VAM 
– the SAS Education Value-Added Assessment System (SAS® EVAAS®) – in the Houston 
Independent School District (HISD). This district is using value-added data more than any other 
in the country for high-stakes purposes, expressly for merit awards and to make teacher 
termination decisions (Corcoran, 2010; Harris, 2011; Mellon, 2010; Otterman, 2010; Papay, 
2010). During the summer of 2011, the two researchers examined SAS® EVAAS® data from four 
teachers whose contracts were not renewed in terms of reliability, bias, teacher attribution, and 
validity. They examined other intended consequences (e.g., value-added use and data informed 
change) and unintended consequences (e.g., perverse side effects) as well.  
 
The SAS Education Value-Added Assessment System (SAS® EVAAS®) 
and the Houston Independent School District (HISD) 
 HISD is the largest school district in Texas and the seventh largest district in the 
country. The district consists of 300 schools, over 200,000 students, and approximately 13,000 
teachers. In addition, the majority of the students in the district are from high-needs 
backgrounds, with 63% of students labeled at risk, 92% from racial minority backgrounds, 80% 
on the federal free-or-reduced lunch program, and 58% classified as ELLs, Limited English 
Proficiency (LEP), or bilingual. While Tennessee, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Ohio use 
SAS® EVAAS® statewide, and other states, districts, and schools are using or have plans to 
implement this model locally, no other school, district, or state uses SAS® EVAAS® for 
consequential decision-making more than HISD (Harris, 2011; Lowrey, 2012; Sparks, 2011).  
 In 2007, HISD created the Accelerating Student Progress: Increasing Results & 
Expectations (ASPIRE) program to recognize and celebrate great teaching as measured by 
student progress (HISD, 2010). District administrators contracted with the SAS software 
company to measure this progress via their SAS® EVAAS® system; this at an approximate cost 
of $500,000 per year.  
 In short, the district has two main teacher evaluation and accountability systems: 1) the 
ASPIRE program in which the district uses one year of SAS® EVAAS® scores to rank order 
teachers throughout the district and 2) the Professional Development and Appraisal System 
(PDAS), in which teacher observation data is collected by certified appraisers and used to 
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evaluate teachers in eight different domains of teacher performance.1 Considering the two 
different foci, however, it is common that the district labels and rewards HISD teachers 
differently across systems, for example, labeling a teacher below average on the PDAS while 
rewarding the teacher with a bonus through the ASPIRE program and vice versa. The district’s 
oft-conflicting systems cause a fair amount of confusion and mistrust, in particular among 
HISD teachers (Corcoran, 2010; Harris, 2011; Papay, 2010).  
 Regardless, with over 20 years of development, the system in use – the SAS® EVAAS® – 
is the largest, most widely implemented, and most widely used VAM in the country. While there 
are at least eight entities developing such models (Banchero & Kesmodel, 2011), like the VAM 
developed by the Value Added Research Center (VARC) in Wisconsin and the growth model 
developed by Dr. Damian Betebenner (the Student Growth Percentiles (SGP) model), SAS® 
EVAAS® is “the most comprehensive reporting package of value-added metrics available in the 
educational market” (SAS, 2012). It is “the most robust and reliable” system available, better 
than the “other simplistic models found in the market today” (SAS, 2012). It “provides valuable 
diagnostic information about [instructional] practices,” helps educators become more proactive 
and make more “sound instructional choices,” and helps teachers use “resources more 
strategically to ensure that every student has the chance to succeed” (SAS, 2012). These claims 
are not without controversy, however (Amrein-Beardsley, 2008; Sanders & Wright, 2008). 
Researchers used these assertions to frame this study, in particular in terms of the intended or 
expected outcomes, as advertised, as well as the unintended outcomes researchers discovered 
along the way.  
Preliminary Evidence 
Even though the district reported that the majority of teachers favor the ASPIRE program 
overall (Harris, 2011), researchers found evidence suggesting that HISD teachers have aversions 
towards the program’s SAS® EVAAS®component (Collins, in progress). In terms of reliability, those 
receiving merit monies attached to their SAS® EVAAS® output often compare winning the rewards 
to “winning the lottery,” given the random, “chaotic,” year-to-year instabilities they see. Such 
consistencies are also well noted in literature (Baeder, 2010; Baker, Barton, Darling-Hammond, 
Haertel, Ladd, Linn et al., 2010; Haertel, 2011; Koedel & Betts, 2007; Papay, 2010). Teachers do not 
seem to understand why they are rewarded, especially because they profess that they do nothing 
differently from year to year as their SAS® EVAAS® rankings “jump around.” Along with the highs 
come much-appreciated monetary awards, but for what teachers did differently from one year to the 
next remains unknown.  
Teachers who do not receive merit monies attribute the lack of rewards to the types of 
students they teach and how these students might bias their scores (Collins, in progress; see also Hill 
et al., 2011; Newton et al., 2010; Rothstein, 2009). Teachers who loop or teach back-to-back grade 
levels report bonuses for the first year and nothing the next as they “max out” on growth the first 
year with the same students. Teachers of grades in which ELLs are transitioned into mainstreamed 
English-only classrooms report being the least likely to demonstrate added value and the most likely 
to be deemed “ineffective.” Teachers of inordinate numbers of special education students express 
similar concerns (Collins, in progress; see also Hill et al., 2011; Newton et al., 2010; Rothstein, 2009). 
                                                
1 During the 2010-11 academic year, HISD educators and community members helped design a new Teacher Appraisal 
and Development System that went into effect during the 2011-12 academic year, replacing PDAS. According to one of 
the district’s Analysts for Accountability and Rewards, HISD plans to use student value-added data as one component of 
this appraisal system beginning in the 2012-13 academic year (S. Mason, personal communication, April 19, 2012).  
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There are also ceiling effects prevalent, whereas teachers of gifted students experience difficulties 
demonstrating added value (see also Wright et al., 1997). 
Almost half (46%) of a sample of HISD teachers who moved to different grade levels 
reported switching value-added ranks after the move, from “ineffective” to “effective” or vice versa, 
also across grade levels that were adjacent (Collins, in progress). This is problematic as the SAS® 
EVAAS® system is purported to measure the teacher effectiveness construct consistently, and 
validly. Dr. William L. Sanders, the developer of the SAS® EVAAS®, claims that teachers who move 
from one environment to another, even if radically different, continue to do just as well (LeClaire, 
2011). 
Furthermore, over half (55%) of a same sample of HISD teachers noted that their SAS® 
EVAAS® reports did not match their supervisors’ observational PDAS scores (Collins, in progress). 
In addition, some suggest that their supervisors are skewing their observational scores to match their 
SAS® EVAAS® scores given external pressures to do so (Collins, in progress). Such practices have 
been shown to occur elsewhere with the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System (TVAAS) 
from which the SAS® EVAAS® was derived (Garland, 2012). In New York as well, if teachers have 
two years of low value-added scores, the teachers are to be rated ineffective overall and terminated, 
regardless of what other measures (e.g., supervisor evaluation scores) indicate or disclose (Ravitch, 
2012). Because these other measures are often perceived as less objective, it seems that measuring 
teacher effectiveness using value-added output is beginning to trump other indicators capturing what 
it means to be an effective teacher. This raises major concerns about cogency and power (i.e., 
evidence of criterion-related validity). Such practices also contradict the field standards developed by 
the prominent national associations on educational measurement and testing (AERA, APA, & 
NCME, 2000). These standards note first and foremost that high-stakes decisions “should not be 
made on the basis of test scores alone. Other relevant information should be taken into account to 
enhance the overall validity of such decisions” (AERA, 2000).  
Ten percent of the same teachers (10%) noted substantive concerns about being evaluated 
for content they were not teaching, or being held accountable while teaching alongside other 
teachers teaching the same students the same subjects at the same time (Collins, in progress). SAS® 
EVAAS® methodologists state they can adequately control for this using fractions and proportional 
contributions, however (Derringer, 2010; Sanders & Horn, 1994).  
Numerous teachers, especially science and social studies teachers teaching non-tested 
subjects in every grade level, also note issues when norm-referenced tests are used with criterion-
referenced tests to determine SAS® EVAAS® growth from year to year. They note concerns about 
the pretest scores used to calculate value-added coming from different tests than the post-test 
scores, and vice versa. Additionally, they note concerns about the norm-referenced tests not being 
linked to state standards. While norm-referenced and criterion-referenced tests can be normed, and 
this is somewhat common, this still raises issues with content alignment (i.e., evidence of content-
related validity).  
In terms of formative uses, because SAS® EVAAS® output is often received months after 
students leave, teachers express that such output makes little sense, and they are learning little about 
what they did effectively or how they might use SAS® EVAAS® data to improve their own 
instruction (see also Eckert & Dabrowski, 2010; Harris, 2011). Of the same sample of HISD 
teachers surveyed, the majority (55%) note that they receive their SAS® EVAAS® reports in the 
summer or fall after students leave their classrooms. A plurality (40%) also reported they were 
unaware of HISD-sponsored professional development trainings about how to better understand or 
use their SAS® EVAAS® data to improve their instruction (Collins, in progress). This is problematic 
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since SAS® EVAAS®’s principal claimed strength is to provide a “wealth of positive diagnostic 
information” for formative purposes (Sanders, Wright, Rivers & Leandro, 2009, p. 9). 
HISD, SAS® EVAAS®, and Teacher Non-Renewals 
In the spring of 2011, HISD did not renew 221 of its teachers’ contracts (HISD, 2011). A 
number of these teachers’ contracts were not renewed at least in part due to “a significant lack of 
student progress attributable to the educator,” or “insufficient student academic growth reflected by 
[SAS® EVAAS®] value-added scores.” HISD did not respond to researchers’ Open Records Request 
(submitted September 15, 2011) soliciting the actual number of unnamed teachers whose contracts 
were not renewed at least in part due to SAS® EVAAS® scores in spring of 2011, however, so it is 
uncertain how many teachers were actually terminated for these reasons. All that is known is that, 
according to one of the lead lawyers retained in these teachers’ defense (A. Reichek, personal 
communication, June 8, 2011), a number of HISD teachers’ non-renewal letters cited these reasons 
for termination. According to the Vice President of the Houston Federation of Teachers (HFT), this 
number was greater than 100 or nearly 50% (Z. Capo, personal communication, April 6, 2012). 
Researchers are also unaware of how many teachers pursued due process hearings, how many of 
them followed their due process hearings through to culmination, and how many were actually 
terminated after their due process hearings concluded. Researchers are, however, aware that 
attaching such high-stakes decisions to VAM output in general is expected “to lead to a flood of 
litigation challenging teacher dismissals” as “value added modeling as a basis for high stakes decision 
making is fraught with problems likely to be vetted in the courts” (Baker, 2012). What researchers 
examined here are four such cases. 
 
Participants 
For four of the terminated teachers, the same lead lawyer invited one of the researchers, (the 
first author, hereafter referred to as the primary researcher) to serve as the expert witness and testify 
on their behalves. In terms of sampling procedures, the primary researcher did not select the four 
teachers with any methodological reason or representative sampling approach. Rather, the teachers 
quasi-selected the researcher via their lawyer. The lawyer retained the primary researcher to testify 
regarding (1) the SAS® EVAAS® in general, (2) whether SAS® EVAAS® output for each teacher 
accurately evidenced that the teacher positively or negatively impacted student achievement and 
growth, and (3) whether the grounds and reasoning on which their contracts were not renewed were 
justifiable and sound.  
The teachers, four female elementary school teachers, were from racial minority 
backgrounds (three were African American and one was Latina). Their ages ranged from 28-51. 
They collectively averaged 11.8 years of teaching experience and 7.5 years teaching in HISD. Two 
were certified via a traditional teacher certification program and the other two were certified via 
HISD’s Alternative Teaching Certificate (ATC) program. All teachers taught core subject areas 
(reading, language arts, math, social studies, and science) in grades 3-7, and they all taught in 
different schools under different school administrations. 
It should be noted, here, that given the sensitive nature of these teachers’ experiences and 
testimonies, the primary researcher also secured the four teachers’ signed permissions to use the data 
collected for the lawsuit also for presentation and publication purposes. The primary researcher 
consulted with each participant about confidentiality, her general rights, and in particular her right to 
opt out of the study or pull her data from study inclusion at any time, and if at any time she felt she 
was at risk or to be placed at risk in the foreseeable future. The primary researcher also gave each 
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participant the contact information for the Chair of the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board, 
through the Arizona State University Office of Research Integrity and Assurance (IRB Study 
#11108006705). 
 
Multiple-Methods, Case Study Approach  
The researchers conducted a case study (Campbell, 1975; Flyvbjerg, 2011; Ragin & Becker, 
2000; Thomas, 2011a) using multiple-methods to examine the collective cases of the four units at 
focus (Gerring, 2004). The cases were similar and separate enough to permit such an analysis, 
especially as each of the teachers had associated experiences and could serve as comparable 
instances of the same general phenomenon (Ragin & Becker, 2000). Their practical experiences 
(Flyvbjerg, 2011) could help others better understand how this value-added system was being used 
within HISD.  
The primary researcher collected retrospective quantitative and qualitative data to better 
comprehend and understand the four teachers’ data that more holistically captured their 
effectiveness as teachers (Creswell, 2008; Day, Sammons, & Gu, 2008; Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 
1989; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). The quantitative documents included each teacher’s SAS® 
EVAAS® scores and supervisor observational scores based on the district’s PDAS system, and the 
qualitative information came from the written comments provided on each teacher’s PDAS forms 
for the same years for which SAS® EVAAS® data were collected and from the in-depth phone 
interviews the primary researcher also conducted.  
Specifically, the primary researcher collected each teacher’s SAS® EVAAS® Teacher Value-
Added Reports (see Figure 1). The district in contract with SAS provides such reports, alongside 
SAS® EVAAS® Reports for Teacher Reflection (see also Figure 1), to teachers yearly through an 
online portal. These reports include a color chart intended to offer teachers a graphical display of 
how their different students (low, middle, and high performing) progressed in their classrooms as 
compared to the district average. The reports also include a table to complement the chart and 
quantify the colors displayed. Resource guides are available to help consumers understand these 
reports as well (see, for example, SAS, 2007) 
 As written, these reports are to be used to evaluate how well individual teachers facilitate 
student achievement on Texas’s Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS and TAKS 
Accommodated) and Stanford/Aprenda achievement tests that are used in non-TAKS grades and 
subject areas. These reports are used to compare how well teachers influence student progress as 
compared to similar teachers within the district. While scores include an individual teacher’s normal 
curve equivalent (NCE) gain, a measure of standard error for confidence, and a district reference 
gain also expressed as an NCE indicating how the district did compared to the state average each 
year, the score of interest here was the gain score index. This score compares each teacher to other 
similar teachers across the district, and this is the score that HISD uses for determining ASPIRE 
awards.2  
 
 
 
                                                
2 As per the statistical rules and policies put in place by SAS® EVAAS® comparisons are made based on one standard 
error. Teachers with a score above 1.0 are deemed as adding value, teachers with a score between 1.0 and -1.0 are 
deemed as not detectably different (NDD), and teachers with a score below -1.0 are deemed as detracting value, 
comparatively.  
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Figure 1.  Teacher C’s SAS® EVAAS® Teacher Value-Added Report for 2010 and SAS® EVAAS® Report for Teacher Reflection. 
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The primary researcher also collected each teacher’s PDAS supervisor evaluation scores. She 
collected their PDAS scores, as they are also valued in HISD’s ASPIRE system, for the same years 
as each teacher’s SAS® EVAAS® scores to help contextualize and better understand each teacher’s 
SAS® EVAAS® data. On the PDAS, both numerical scores (i.e., scores marked for each of the eight 
domains included on the PDAS instrument and overall) and supervisors’ written comments (i.e., by 
domain and overall) were collected for analysis (see a listing of these domains in Sidebar 1; see also 
PDAS, 2004).  
 
Sidebar 1 
The Eight Observational Domains of the Professional Development Appraisal System (PDAS)3 
 
I. Active Successful Participation in the Learning Process  
II. Learner-Centered Instruction  
III. Evaluation and Feedback on Student Progress 
IV. Management of Student Discipline, Instructional Strategy, Time, and Materials  
V. Professional Communication  
VI. Professional Development  
VII. Compliance with Policies, Operating Procedures and Requirements  
VIII. Improvement of Academic Performance of all Students on the Campus 
 
While it is likely that observational scores are often inflated, and this is in large part why 
more objective measures of teacher effectiveness like VAMs are adopted and implemented (Jacob & 
Lefgren, 2007; Harris, 2009, 2011; Ravitch, 2012), it was also important to examine whether in fact 
observational measures correlated with SAS® EVAAS® output (see also Milanowski, Kimball, & 
White, 2004). The primary researcher collected this information here because general evidence is 
lacking to indicate that this measure of teacher value-added is indeed related to at least one other 
correlated criterion (i.e., evidence of criteria-related validity). The primary researcher also collected 
other indicators teachers might have had for the same years of analysis, especially about their 
effectiveness as teachers and to further examine this type of validity. 
Finally, the primary researcher collected qualitative data via extensive phone interviews. The 
researcher spoke with each of the four teachers by phone in the summer of 2011 an average of 2.5 
hours per interview. She followed-up with shorter phone calls for verification purposes on occasion. 
During each phone interview, she first asked each teacher a set of demographic questions (teaching 
certification, number of total years teaching and teaching in HISD, age, and racial backgrounds). She 
then asked each teacher to explain their corpus of data for each school year, as aligned with the 
aforementioned documents. Last, she asked each teacher an additional four, open-ended questions 
to get at any information that might have been missed and to take a preliminary look at data 
comprehension, use, and levels of professional support for both. The primary researcher asked each 
teacher the following: 
• Is there anything else you can think of in terms of reasons why your contract is not being 
renewed (e.g., excessive absenteeism, insubordination, other test scores)? 
• Do you understand your SAS® EVAAS® value-added scores? 
• Have you received training on how to understand your SAS® EVAAS®reports/scores?  
• Have you received professional development as a result of your SAS® EVAAS® scores? 
                                                
3 To find out more about these domains, including information about the subscores situated within each domain, see 
(PDAS, 2004). 
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Data Analysis  
The primary researcher transcribed the interview data and analyzed the transcripts alongside 
the numerical data, year-by-year, to establish a longitudinal chain of evidence (Yin, 1994). 
Specifically, the primary researcher analyzed the data by case, and then compared incidents within 
individuals over time. The researcher developed working assertions across cases, as well, to integrate 
and develop broader themes (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Patton, 2001).  
The teachers involved in the study verified results and findings via a series of member-
checks (Guba & Lincoln, 1981). The four teachers read the final report and checked it for accuracy 
and authenticity, clarified misunderstandings and misconceptions, and verified the overall findings. 
Researchers also resituated the findings within the literature if they added to specific topics about 
value-added methods and systems specifically or in general.  
It is important to highlight that the experiences of these four teachers should not, however, 
be used to generalize beyond HISD or to all teachers in HISD. Nevertheless, the researchers are 
confident that their findings still deliver a strong message and may generalize to the other 
approximately 100 plus teachers whose contracts were not renewed at least in part due to “a 
significant lack of student progress attributable to the educator,” or “insufficient student academic 
growth reflected by [SAS® EVAAS®] value-added scores.” Even with a limited, non-representative 
sample of four, patterns and overall findings may also help others understand this particular value-
added system better, via the lived experiences of these teachers in HISD (Feagin & Orum, 1991; Yin 
1994).  
Results 
Teacher A 
Teacher A, a university-certified teacher, was an elementary school teacher in HISD since 
2000. Illustrated in Table 1 is a summary of Teacher A’s SAS® EVAAS® and PDAS scores and 
ASPIRE bonuses since 2007, the first year of HISD’s ASPIRE system.  
 
Table 1 
Teacher A’s SAS® EVAAS® and PDAS scores and ASPIRE bonuses (2007-2010) 
 
 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 
 Grade 5 Grade 4 Grade 3 Grade 3 Grade 5 
Math -2.03 +0.68* +0.16* +3.46 n/a 
Reading -1.15 -0.96* +2.03 +1.81 n/a 
Language Arts  +1.12 -0.49* -1.77 -0.20* n/a 
Science  +2.37 -3.45 n/a n/a n/a 
Social Studies  +0.91* -2.39 n/a n/a n/a 
PDAS: % of Total  98.0% 98.4% 98.4% 89.0% 53.7% 
ASPIRE Bonus $3,400 $700 $3,700 $0 n/a 
 
*Notes: Scores shaded as green indicate that the teacher added value according to SAS® EVAAS® data and in 
comparison to other similar teachers across the district. Scores shaded as red indicate the opposite. (1) Scores with 
asterisks (*) do not signify statistical significance, but the opposite. They signify that the scores were not detectibly 
different (NDD). This means that the progress Teacher A’s class made was not detectively different from the reference 
gain scores of other teachers across HISD given one standard error; however, the scores are still reported to both the 
teachers and their supervisors as they are here.  
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Across all years and subject areas for which Teacher A had SAS® EVAAS® data, she added 
value to her students' learning (relative to all other HISD teachers) 50% of the time (8/16 of SAS® 
EVAAS® observations), and detracted value (relative to all other HISD teachers) the other 50% of 
the time (8/16 of SAS® EVAAS® observations). According to these SAS® EVAAS® output, the 
probability that Teacher A was truly an effective or ineffective teacher was no different than the flip 
of a coin. Additionally, looking at Teacher A’s most recent years of activity, she added more value 
than she had in previous years, making termination unreasonable and indefensible, especially on the 
grounds that there was “a significant lack of student progress attributable to the educator” or 
“insufficient student academic growth reflected by [SAS® EVAAS®] value-added scores.”  
Analyzing Teacher A’s SAS® EVAAS® scores alongside her PDAS scores, it is not only 
visually obvious that there is something peculiar about the relationship between Teacher A’s 
performance on the SAS® EVAAS® and her supervisor evaluation scores, it is also statistically 
evident. The correlation between Teacher A’s SAS® EVAAS® and PDAS scores across reading (r = -
0.51), math (r = -0.83), and language arts (r = -0.11) from 2007-2010 suggest that beyond no 
correlation, the better Teacher A did on the SAS® EVAAS® the worse she did in the eyes of her 
supervisor(s), and vice versa. In addition, Teacher A was monetarily rewarded in a way that did not 
make sense. The worse she did the more money she received (r = -0.42). Until 2010-2011, Teacher 
A “exceeded expectations” across every PDAS domain, and her colleagues recognized her as both a 
“Teacher of the Month” and the “Teacher of the Year” in 2010. 
Otherwise, Teacher A was only familiar with SAS® EVAAS® due to the score reports 
distributed each year and because her colleagues and supervisors used to talk about something called 
“value-added.” Nobody ever explained her SAS® EVAAS® scores to her, and she never fully 
understood what the numbers meant, how they could impact or “hurt her,” or how she could use 
her SAS® EVAAS® scores to help her improve her own instruction. Additionally, she never received 
professional development as a result of her value-added scores, although whether she needed 
professional development to help her improve her value-added scores is questionable.  
 
Teacher B 
Teacher B, a career-changer with a bachelor’s and master’s degree in mathematics, was 
certified as a math teacher for grades 2-12 via HISD’s Alternative Teaching Certificate (ATC) 
program in 2007. Illustrated in Table 2 is a summary of Teacher B’s SAS® EVAAS® and PDAS 
scores and ASPIRE bonuses scores since 2008. 
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Table 2 
Teacher B’s SAS® EVAAS® and PDAS scores and ASPIRE bonuses (2008-2010) 
 
 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 
 Grade 7 Grade 7 Grade 7 Grade 9 & 10 
Math -1.07 -2.36 +1.62 n/a 
PDAS:% of Total  58.0% 55.3% 59.2% n/a 
ASPIREBonus $1,750 $0 $4,700 n/a 
 
*Notes: Scores shaded as green indicate that the teacher added value according to SAS® EVAAS® data and in 
comparison to other similar teachers across the district. Scores shaded as red indicate the opposite. (1) Scores with 
asterisks (*) do not signify statistical significance, but the opposite. They signify that the scores were not detectibly 
different (NDD). This means that the progress Teacher B’s class made was not detectively different from the reference 
gain scores of other teachers across HISD given one standard error; however, the scores are still reported to both the 
teachers and their supervisors as they are here. 
 
Teacher B’s relative value-added scores were negative for math for two years, and positive 
for the most recent year for which she had SAS® EVAAS® data. In her most recent position for 
which she had SAS® EVAAS® data she seemed to have added value to her students’ learning. She 
taught alongside another math teacher who taught nearly half of her students math an equal amount 
of time per week all year. Whether she alone demonstrated “a significant lack of student progress 
attributable to the educator,” or “insufficient student academic growth reflected by [SAS® EVAAS®] 
value-added scores” is debatable. In addition, value-added researchers agree that at least three years 
of value-added data are needed to make such judgments (Baker, 2012; Brophy, 1973; Cody, 
McFarland, Moore, & Preston, 2010; Harris, 2011), and even then a 25% risk of misclassification 
remains (Au, 2010; CCSSO, 2010; Otterman, 2010; Schochet & Chiang, 2010; Shaw & Bovaird, 
2011). She did not have three years of consistent data, and her most recent year was demonstrably 
her best.  
Analyzing Teacher B’s SAS® EVAAS®scores alongside her PDAS scores, there is a strong 
relationship between Teacher B’s SAS® EVAAS® and supervisor evaluation scores (r = 0.91). The 
better Teacher B did on the SAS® EVAAS® the better she did in the eyes of her supervisor(s), and 
vice versa. This yields the type of correlation coefficient we would expect to see if both indicators 
reliably and validly measured teacher effectiveness (i.e., criterion-related evidence of validity). In 
addition, Teacher B was monetarily rewarded in a way that made sense; the better she did the more 
money she received (r = 0.93).  
 Otherwise, the knowledge that Teacher B had about the SAS® EVAAS® was also sparse. She 
did not understand how “they” calculated her value-added scores. She would “just see the scores.” 
She also knew that “they” compared her scores “to everybody else’s in the district.” This teacher did 
not receive training to understand, or professional development to improve her value-added scores, 
although whether her most-recent value-added scores were in need of improvement is unclear.  
 
Teacher C 
Teacher C graduated with a bachelor’s degree in early childhood education in 1999, and 
received a master’s degree in school counseling in 2000. Thereafter, she served as a long-term 
substitute in HISD until she took a full-time teaching position in HISD, teaching 6th grade in 2003. 
Illustrated in Table 3 is a summary of Teacher C’s SAS® EVAAS® and PDAS scores and ASPIRE 
bonuses since 2007. 
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Table 3 
Teacher C’s SAS® EVAAS® and PDAS scores and ASPIRE bonuses (2007-2010) 
 
 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 
 Grade 6 Grade 6 Grade 6 Grade 6 
Math -1.67 -2.58 n/a n/a 
Science n/a n/a n/a -1.09 
Social Studies -1.72 -0.16* -1.14 n/a 
PDAS: % of Total  84.6% 86.3% 88.6% 78.0% 
ASPIRE Bonus $1,000 $100 $475 $1,225 
 
*Notes: Scores shaded as green indicate that the teacher added value according to SAS® EVAAS® data and in 
comparison to other similar teachers across the district. Scores shaded as red indicate the opposite. (1) Scores with 
asterisks (*) do not signify statistical significance, but the opposite. They signify that the scores were not detectibly 
different (NDD). This means that the progress Teacher C’s class made was not detectively different from the reference 
gain scores of other teachers across HISD given one standard error; however, the scores are still reported to both the 
teachers and their supervisors as they are here. 
 
 Teacher C’s overall SAS® EVAAS® scores across years and subjects evidence that Teacher C 
detracted value from her students’ learning (relative to all other HISD teachers) 100% of the time 
across three subject areas. This was likely because Teacher C taught some of the highest needs 
students, possibly across the district, however. The ages of the 6th grade students in her remedial 
classes ranged from 10 (the typical age of a 6th grader) to 15 (the typical age of a high school 
freshman). Almost half of Teacher C’s students over time had been retained in grade one to four 
times prior.  
 Analyzing Teacher C’s SAS® EVAAS® scores alongside her math PDAS scores was not 
possible as only two SAS® EVAAS® scores were available, although her social studies SAS® EVAAS® 
and PDAS scores were mildly related (r = 0.26). Teacher C’s monetary bonuses and PDAS scores 
were also mildly related (r = 0.29). Until 2010-11, she “exceeded expectations” across almost every 
domain in terms of her supervisor evaluations. She was also given a “Teacher of the Year” award 
during the 2007-08 school year by her teacher peers. 
Otherwise, the knowledge that Teacher C had about the SAS® EVAAS® was also limited. 
She understood that she was being compared to other HISD teachers who taught the same subject 
areas to students who were “very different than her students.” She, like the others, never received 
training to understand, or professional development to improve, her value-added scores.  
 
Teacher D 
Teacher D graduated with a bachelor’s degree in business and administration in 2005 and in 
2007 was certified as a teacher for grades 4-8 via HISD’s Alternative Teaching Certificate (ATC) 
program. She took a full-time teaching position in HISD in 2006. Illustrated in Table 4 is a summary 
of Teacher D’s SAS® EVAAS® and PDAS scores and ASPIRE bonuses since 2007. 
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Table 4 
Teacher D’s SAS® EVAAS® and PDAS scores and ASPIRE bonuses (2007-2010) 
 
 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 
 Grade 4 Grade 3 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 3 
Reading +0.36* -0.17* -2.28 -3.88 n/a 
Language Arts  -1.60 +1.28 +0.39* -3.25 n/a 
Social Studies n/a n/a n/a -2.36 n/a 
PDAS: % of Total  65.5% 71.4% 74.5% 61.6% 43.5% 
ASPIRE Bonus $1,500 $2,900 $2,150 $1,250 n/a 
 
* Notes: Scores shaded as green indicate that the teacher added value according to SAS® EVAAS® data and in 
comparison to other similar teachers across the district. Scores shaded as red indicate the opposite. (1) Scores with 
asterisks (*) do not signify statistical significance, but the opposite. They signify that the scores were not detectibly 
different (NDD). This means that the progress Teacher D’s class made was not detectively different from the reference 
gain scores of other teachers across HISD given one standard error; however, the scores are still reported to both the 
teachers and their supervisors as they are here. 
 
Up until 2009-2010 Teacher D, like Teacher A, switched back and forth across subject areas, 
demonstrating added overall from 2006-2009 50% of the time (3/6 SAS® EVAAS® observations) 
and demonstrating negative value 50% of the time (3/6 SAS® EVAAS® observations). According to 
her SAS® EVAAS® output, like Teacher A, the probability that Teacher D was an effective teacher 
up until 2009-2010 was no different than the flip of a coin. Given Teacher D’s most recent year of 
SAS® EVAAS® data (2009-2010), however, she seemingly detracted from student learning across all 
three subject areas. In 2009-2010 Teacher D was assigned to teach an inordinate number of ELLs 
who were transitioned into her classroom. This will be discussed in more detail later. Regardless, 
whether Teacher D demonstrated “a significant lack of student progress attributable to the 
educator,” or “insufficient student academic growth reflected by [SAS® EVAAS®] value-added 
scores” is still disputable.   
In terms of the relationship between Teacher D’s performance on the PDAS and her 
students’ SAS® EVAAS® scores in reading, there was a mild correlation (r = 0.29). In terms of her 
performance on the PDAS and her students’ SAS® EVAAS® scores in language arts, there was a 
strong correlation (r = 0.92). In addition, the better Teacher D scored on the SAS® EVAAS® the 
more money she received (r = 0.79). Until 2010-11, she “exceeded expectations” or was “proficient” 
across every domain in terms of her supervisor evaluations. 
In terms of Teacher D’s knowledge about the SAS® EVAAS®, she reported not 
understanding how “they” could use different tests to evaluate her and whether she added or 
detracted value from her students’ learning. She also did not trust whether “they” could really 
account for the types of students she had her in classroom, especially when she taught a 
disproportionate number of ELLs, in comparison and in her last year. While she reported having 
tried to figure SAS® EVAAS® out on her own online via the district’s online resources, she found it 
very confusing. It “just did not hit home.”  
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Findings 
Reliability 
According its developers, SAS® EVAAS® is meant to “assess and predict student 
performance with precision and reliability” and it is “the most robust and reliable” value-added 
system available, more than the “other simplistic models found in the market today” (SAS, 2011). In 
terms of the data presented here, however, it is clear that inconsistencies were a consistent problem. 
Across the four cases, issues with reliability were evident. Such issues with reliability are also well 
documented in the literature (Au, 2010; Baeder, 2010; Baker et al, 2010; CCSSO, 2010; Haertel, 
2011; Koedel & Betts, 2007; Papay, 2010, Shaw & Bovaird, 2011; Schochet & Chiang, 2010).  
Yet these four teachers were removed from their teaching positions “at least in part” due to 
SAS® EVAAS® data that in three of the four cases researchers evidenced as unreliable (see Tables 1-
4). The probability that three of the four teachers added or detracted value from year-to-year was 
roughly the same as the flip of a coin. This is pragmatically, methodologically, conceptually, and 
morally concerning. In addition, as researchers suggest that at least three years of value-added data 
are needed to make such judgments (Brophy, 1973; Cody et al., 2010; Harris, 2011), and even then 
with a 25% risk of misclassification (Au, 2010; CCSSO, 2010; Otterman, 2010; Schochet & Chiang, 
2010; Shaw & Bovaird, 2011), this is also troublesome. Not one of the four teachers had three years 
of consistent data (that were detectibly different from other similar teachers) to warrant non-
renewal.  
Other HISD teachers whom researchers interviewed (Collins, in progress) noted concerns 
about this as well, again comparing the receipt of merit monies based on SAS® EVAAS® data to 
“winning the lottery.” One eighth grade advanced English teacher noted:  
I do what I do every year. I teach the way I teach every year. [My] first year got me 
pats on the back. [My] second year got me kicked in the backside. And for year three 
my scores were off the charts. I got a huge bonus, and now I am in the top quartile 
of all the English teachers. What did I do differently? I have no clue. 
 
A 7th grade history teacher classified her past three years as “bonus, bonus, disaster.” A social studies 
teacher added:  
We had an 8th grade teacher, a very good teacher, the “real science guy,” [who was a] 
very good teacher…[but] every year he showed low [SAS®] EVAAS® growth. My 
principal flipped him with the 6th grade science teacher who was getting the highest 
[SAS®] EVAAS® scores on campus. Huge [SAS®] EVAAS® scores. [And] now the 
6th grade teacher [is showing] no growth [as an 8th grade teacher], but the 8th grade 
teacher who was sent down [to the 6th grade] is getting the biggest bonuses on 
campus. 
 
SAS® EVAAS® developers claim they have evidence that teachers who move from one 
environment to another, even if radically different, continue to do as well and are classified the same 
in SAS® EVAAS® terms over time (LeClaire, 2011). Evidence presented herein should yield caution 
regarding this assertion. 
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Bias 
Teachers credited such “chaos” to the different students they taught and the different 
classroom contexts in which they taught year-to-year. For example, while Teacher C’s SAS® 
EVAAS® data illustrated that Teacher C consistently detracted value from her students’ learning, and 
did so across subject areas, this was likely because Teacher C taught some of the highest-need 
students, possibly across the district.  
In addition, HISD teachers note that those teaching inordinate numbers of special education 
students in mainstreamed classrooms are least likely to add value (Collins, in progress). Teachers 
teaching the same students over consecutive years (e.g., looping) report receiving bonuses for the 
first year and nothing the next as they are “maxing out” on growth, and actually “competing with 
themselves.” Teachers agree that it is best for them “to get average kids, yes, because the regular 
kids, you can grow those kids!”  
Teachers teaching gifted students report finding it very difficult to add value and get merit 
pay as a result (Collins, in progress; see also Wright, Horn, & Sanders, 1997). They report being able 
to “only get them up so much!” One teacher working with gifted students noted:  
Every year I have the highest test scores, [and] I have fellow teachers that [sic] come 
up to me when they get their bonuses…One recently came up to me [and] literally 
cried, ‘I’m so sorry.’… I’m like, ‘Don’t be sorry…It’s not your fault.’ Here I 
am…with the highest test scores and I’m getting $0 in bonuses. It makes no sense 
year-to-year how this works…. How do I, how do I, you know, I don’t know what 
to do. I don’t know how to get higher than a 100%. 
 
Another 5th grade teacher working with gifted students explained: 
I have students [in a 5th grade gifted reading class] who score at the 6th, 7th, & 8th grade 
levels in reading. But I’m like please babies, score at the 9th grade level, cause if you 
don’t score at the 9th or 10th grade or higher in 5th grade with me, I’m going to show 
negative growth. Even though you, you’re gifted, and you’re talented, and you’re 
high! I can only push you so much higher when you are already so high. I’m scared. 
 
Teachers teaching in grades in which ELLs were transitioned into mainstreamed English-
only classrooms also report being the least likely to add value. One 4th grade teacher noted:  
I went to a transition classroom, and now there’s a red flag next to my name. I guess 
now I’m an ineffective teacher? I keep getting letters from the district, saying ‘You’ve 
been recognized as an outstanding teacher’…this, this, and that. But now because I 
teach English Language Learners who ‘transition in,’ my scores drop? And I get a 
flag next to my name for not teaching them well? 
 
A 5th grade teacher added: 
I’m scared to teach in the 4th grade. I’m scared I might lose my job if I teach in a[n] 
[ELL] transition grade level, because I’m scared my scores are going to drop, and I’m 
going to get fired because there’s probably going to be no growth. 
 
Another 4th/5th grade teacher explained, “When they say nobody wants to do 4th grade – 
nobody wants to do 4th grade! Nobody” (Collins, in progress). This was evidenced in the data 
collected for Teacher D as well who, like Teacher A, switched back and forth across subject areas 
until her last year during which she purportedly detracted value across subject areas. This was the 
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year her supervisor assigned her to teach an ELL transition year, during which an inordinate number 
of ELLs entered her classroom.  
Until SAS® EVAAS® developers can evidence that teachers teaching inordinate numbers of 
ELLs particularly in transition years, and teachers teaching special education or gifted students are 
not disparately impacted by the non-random placement of these students into their classrooms 
(Monk, 1987; Rothstein, 2009), terminating teachers on these grounds is remiss and morally 
indefensible. Just recently, both SAS® EVAAS® and HISD’s Chief Human Resources Officer 
acknowledged via email that ceiling effects adversely impacted some teachers working with gifted 
students in their capacities to demonstrate value-added (A. Best, personal communication, January 
21, 2012).  
On the contrary, SAS® EVAAS® developers continue to claim that student background 
factors do not impact students’ ability to grow year-to-year in the SAS® EVAAS® model, mainly 
because the system uses students’ previous years of data as “blocking factors” to prevent such 
variables from biasing or distorting growth (Sanders & Horn, 1994, 1998; Sanders et al., 2009; 
Wright, White, Sanders, & Rivers, 2010). As evidenced here, these claims might not be entirely true. 
Appropriately, this is also one of SAS® EVAAS® developer’s most highly contested claims (Amrein-
Beardsley, 2008; Ballou, Sanders, & Wright, 2004; Braun, 2005; Cody et al., 2010; Kuppermintz, 
2003; McCaffrey et al., 2003; McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, Louis, & Hamilton, 2004b; Sanders & 
Wright, 2008; Sanders et al., 2009; Tekwe, Carter, Ma, Algina, Lucas, Roth et al., 2004).  
 
Teacher Attribution  
The aforementioned lack of reliability could also be due to other context-related issues that 
further complicate the calculation of a teacher’s value-added. Teacher B, for example, whose SAS® 
EVAAS® scores were negative for two years and positive for the most recent year for which she had 
data, taught for the same years alongside a math enrichment teacher who taught almost half of her 
students at the same time and an equal amount of time per week. Teacher A was not a teacher of 
record for approximately 50% of her students one of the years for which she was held accountable 
using the SAS® EVAAS® because she was moved from teaching the third to the fourth grade mid-
year. Another HISD teacher taught alongside a reading specialist four days per week, and then 
posted the most growth and received the largest bonus she ever had (Collins, in progress). It is 
uncertain whether the reading specialist received a bonus for her apparent contributions as well.  
Nonetheless, these instances raise concerns about the percentage of value teachers under this 
system add to, or detract from their students’ learning and achievement and whether they can be 
held responsible for 100% of their students’ scores. These issues might also play into why such 
inconsistencies are evident. Determining what percent of value-added scores can be attributed to 
teachers is very difficult, if even possible (Campbell & Stanley, 1963; Corcoran, 2010; Ishii, & 
Rivkin, 2009; Kane & Staiger, 2008; Kennedy, 2010; Linn, 2008; Nelson, 2011; Papay, 2010; 
Rothstein, 2009). 
SAS® EVAAS® developers claim, though, that through a linking verification process (during 
which teachers mark for what percent of each student’s instruction (s)he should be held 
accountable) they can partition out different teachers’ value-added effects (Derringer, 2010; Sanders 
& Horn, 1994). However, there is no empirical evidence suggesting that numerically splitting or 
dividing teacher effects accurately accounts for a teacher’s contribution. In addition, not only is such 
a practice counterintuitive, but breaking up effort across teachers using percentages and proportions 
is nonsensical given the interaction effects that occur among and between students and teachers 
(Monk, 1987). Teachers are situated in complex and collaborative learning environments. It is highly 
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unlikely their value-added effects can be fractionalized using simple or even complex mathematics 
and statistics.  
 
Criterion-Related Evidence of Validity 
One way to generate criterion-related evidence of validity is to assess whether teachers who 
demonstrate added value are also the teachers deemed effective through other, independent 
measures of teacher quality concurrently or at the same time (see also McCaffrey, Lockwood, 
Koretz, Louis, & Hamilton, 2004a). In this instance, researchers examined whether the four non-
renewed teachers also seemed to be ineffectual given their PDAS scores, specifically to determine if 
these teachers’ supervisors also observed that these teachers were inadequate.  
Analyzing the four teachers’ SAS® EVAAS® scores over time alongside their PDAS scores, 
researchers found statistical signals indicating that both of these measures were not measuring the 
teaching effectiveness construct accurately and consistently across teachers. The better Teacher A 
did on the SAS® EVAAS® the worse she did in the eyes of her supervisor(s) (r = -0.51, r = -0.83, r = 
-0.11). Yet for Teacher B, the better she did on the SAS® EVAAS® the better she did on the PDAS 
(r = 0.91). This yields the type of correlation coefficient we would expect to see if in fact both 
indicators pointed in the same direction, yielding valid results. Researchers were not able to analyze 
Teacher C’s math SAS® EVAAS® scores alongside her PDAS scores, but her social studies SAS® 
EVAAS® and PDAS scores were mildly related (r = 0.26). For Teacher D there were weak to strong 
results (r = 0.29, r = 0.92). The conclusion here is that there is nothing substantive to evidence that 
a valid teacher evaluation system, based on SAS® EVAAS® and PDAS scores, is in place and in use. 
This assertion is however limited by the small sample size herein. 
Additionally, analyzing all four teachers’ SAS® EVAAS® scores over time alongside their 
bonuses, researchers found that both of these measures failed to assess the teaching effectiveness 
construct accurately and consistently across teachers as well. The worse Teacher A did on the SAS® 
EVAAS® the more money she received (r = -0.42), and the better Teacher B did the more money 
she received (r = 0.93). Teacher C’s monetary bonuses and SAS® EVAAS® scores were mildly 
related (r = 0.29), and Teacher D’s monetary bonuses and SAS® EVAAS® scores were more strongly 
related (r = 0.79). Again, the small sample size certainly limits generalizability here, although 
evidence of this occurring elsewhere exists (Collins, in progress; Harris, 2011). 
In addition, three of four teachers were honored with teaching awards (e.g., teacher of the 
year or month awards) during the same years for which they posted SAS® EVAAS® data that at least 
in part led to their contracts not being renewed. Teacher C ironically received a Teacher of the Year 
award, awarded to her by her peers, at the same time she detracted the most value from her 
students’ learning according to her SAS® EVAAS® data. This raises additional concerns about 
whether these indicators are capturing the teaching effectiveness construct effectively, or validly. See 
notes above about sample size limitations. 
 
External Pressures 
It is also important to note that these teachers felt that they were targeted for termination 
because of the performance of the schools in which they taught, which were labeled “in-need-of-
improvement” under NCLB. According to the four teachers, administrators were under intense 
district and state pressure, and administrators set out or were forced to “restructure the school” and 
“start firing teachers.” Teachers A, B, C, and D all felt that they were part of “a larger plan.” Because 
they believed their supervisors perceived them to have low, or possibly lower value-added scores 
than their peers, the teachers felt that they had been put “on a list.” It was at this time when they 
became most vulnerable, and when their PDAS observational scores plummeted.  
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Teacher A, for example, “exceeded expectations” on her yearly PDAS reports until 2010-
2011 when a new principal arrived and ranked her “proficient” or “below expectations” across 
domains. Teacher B’s PDAS scores dropped as well, but her supervisor wrote on her PDAS form 
that she could not have earned higher scores because the state classified the school’s scores as 
“unacceptable.” Three different administrators evaluated Teacher C and she consistently “exceeded 
expectations,” but in 2010-2011 when she was evaluated by a short-term administrator, she too was 
rated as “proficient” or “below expectations” across the board. Similarly, Teacher D’s supervisor’s 
actions became perceptibly more aggressive.  
Other teachers noted that their supervisors were beginning to skew their observational 
scores given external pressures to do so (Collins, in progress). One social studies teacher stated: 
Here’s the problem: No principal wants to be called in by the superintendent or 
another superior and [asked], ‘How come your teachers show negative growth but 
you have high evaluations on them? Are you doing your job? I don’t understand. 
Your teacher shows no growth but you have [marked them] as exceeding 
expectations all up and down the chart?’ Now it’s not just this [sic] data over here 
that’s gonna harm us, it’s the principals [who are] adjusting our data over there to 
match the [SAS®] EVAAS®. So it looks like they’re being consistent. 
 
A middle school teacher agreed: “Well my evaluations were fine, but of course now they 
have to make the evaluation match the SAS® EVAAS®. We now have to go through that.” An 8th 
grade teacher added:  
They’re not about to go to bat [for us, although] a few of them will. But most of 
them are going to go in there, and they’re going to create a teacher evaluation that 
reflects the [SAS® EVAAS®] data because they don’t want to have to explain, again 
and again, why they’re giving high classroom observation assessments when the data 
shows [sic] that the teacher is low performing. 
 
A 4th grade teacher noted, “Our principal pressures us. You bet she pressures. If you don’t 
make [SAS® EVAAS®], then it goes against you in your PDAS. In a roundabout way she finds a way 
to put that against you.” An 8th grade advanced English teacher added: 
My boss had to go to the district superintendent and explain why we needed to be 
kept, when ultimately the data showed that we weren’t good teachers… [But] you’ve 
got other good teachers who are being thrown under the bus because of this system. 
 
From these teachers’ perspectives, it seems that many district administrators are more 
trusting of SAS® EVAAS® and are skewing PDAS data to match. This makes sense in theory, as the 
SAS® EVAAS® is the objective system that the district has purchased, and traditional observational 
scores are increasingly being dismissed as subjective (Harris, 2011). In Tennessee and New York 
there is evidence of local policies pushing such practices (Baker, 2012; Garland, 2012; Ravitch, 
2012), although again such practices contradict the field standards encouraging the use of multiple 
measures for decision-making (AERA, APA, & NCME, 2000).  
 
Diagnostics and Formative Uses 
Overall, Teachers A, B, C, and D were only familiar with SAS® EVAAS®. They understood 
that they were being compared to other similar teachers within the district, and they understood 
their scores were available each year via the district’s online portal system, but that was about the 
extent of their knowledge. Nobody had explained their SAS® EVAAS® data to them, and none of 
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the four teachers understood what their SAS® EVAAS® numbers meant, how they were calculated, 
how their SAS® EVAAS® scores could be “used against [them],” or conversely how they could use 
their SAS® EVAAS® scores to help them improve their instruction. Teacher D took steps to figure 
out her SAS® EVAAS® scores on her own, but her SAS® EVAAS® scores still “just did not hit 
home” (see also Eckert & Dabrowski, 2010).  
The four terminated teachers did not receive professional development from HISD or SAS® 
EVAAS® as a result of their value-added scores either. However, given the scores illustrated in 
Tables 1-4, whether each teacher needed professional development to improve their value-added 
scores is disputable. Because they were terminated at least in part due to their SAS® EVAAS® scores, 
and because they were reportedly not given professional development to improve their scores, this 
too is troublesome. Similarly, none of the teachers noted that they used SAS® EVAAS® data to 
inform their instruction, in many ways because they did not understand it.  
In short, no data suggest that for these four teachers in HISD that the SAS® EVAAS® 
system “provides valuable diagnostic information about [instructional] practices,” helps educators 
become more proactive and make more “sound instructional choices,” and helps teachers use their 
“resources more strategically to ensure that every student has the chance to succeed” (SAS, 2011). In 
addition, 60% of a sample of HISD teachers indicate that they are not using SAS® EVAAS® data to 
inform their instruction either. This is not to say, however, that this is not occurring elsewhere, 
perhaps in the district for the other 40% (taking into account sampling error) or in other states, 
districts, and schools using the SAS® EVAAS® system (see, for example, marketing testimonials 
available on the SAS website, SAS, 2012).  
Conclusions 
In the end, Teachers A, B, and D pursued due process hearings, but they decided not to 
follow their hearings through to culmination. They ultimately decided to quit teaching in HISD or 
altogether. Teacher C (the teacher who according to her SAS® EVAAS® output had the poorest 
value-added scores) took her case through her due process hearing. Her hearing officer noted that 
the types of students Teacher C typically taught most likely biased her capacity to demonstrate 
value-added and show growth. The hearing officer also noted that Teacher C did not have multiple 
years of consistent data in the core subject areas she taught to warrant a decision regarding whether 
she was indeed an effective teacher.  
But in sum, and based on the cases of these four teachers, it seems the district is 
inappropriately using inconsistent data within and across subject areas to make high stakes decisions 
about teachers, and in this case teacher termination. This was evidenced through examinations of 
four teachers’ SAS® EVAAS® data, how they correlated with other data meant to capture the same 
teaching effectiveness construct, and teachers’ complementary stories, collected to better examine 
the data and other relevant issues. 
The goal of this study was also to examine other intended and unintended effects of the 
SAS® EVAAS® system, in particular given HISD’s use of the system for high-stakes decision-
making. In terms of intended effects, the four terminated teachers did not seem to understand 
SAS® EVAAS® output well enough to understand or use value-added data to inform or improve 
their instruction. This happens particularly when district leaders do not provide professional 
development to promote formative use (see also Eckert & Dabrowski, 2010; Harris, 2011). But 
this is also particularly problematic in that “when cases challenging dismissal based on VAM 
make it to court, deliberations will center on [among other things]…whether teachers are able to 
understand the basis for which they have been dismissed and whether it is assumed that they 
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have had any control over their fate” (Baker 2012). In general, whether VAMs succeed in their 
intended objectives will also bet contested. Researchers examined these issues here by framing 
this study around the marketing materials publicized by SAS® EVAAS®.  
In terms of unintended effects, however, researchers also evidenced specific issues with 
reliability, bias, teacher attribution, and validity; issues also evident in the growing research literature 
and also named in the anticipated lawsuits (Baker, 2012). Researchers found that high-stakes use of 
SAS® EVAAS® in this district seems to be exacerbating unintended effects.  
Results from the four teachers indicate there are consistent problems with 
inconsistencies with the SAS® EVAAS® data (see also Au, 2010; Baeder, 2010; Baker et al., 2010; 
Corcoran, 2010; Haertel, 2011; Koedel & Betts, 2007; Papay, 2010). These inconsistencies are 
likely related to the measurement errors already inherent in standardized tests and the errors 
intensified when SAS® EVAAS® researchers mix norm- and criterion-referenced tests together, 
use tests that are not appropriately scaled or designed to measure growth upwards, and try to 
account for or inpute missing longitudinal data. SAS® EVAAS® researchers also do not seem to 
be sufficiently controlling for many extraneous variables using even their most sophisticated 
controls and blocking methods. Such extraneous variables include parental contributions to 
learning outside of school, after school programming, pullout and intensive programs, tutor 
effects, prior teachers’ residual effects on current year test scores, differential summer learning 
losses and gains, student motivation factors, peer and teacher interaction effects, and other 
variables impacting non-traditional classrooms (see also Haertel, 2011; Harris, 2011; Rothstein, 
2009; Sanders et al., 2009; Shaw & Bovaird, 2011; Wilson, Hallman, Pecheone, & Moss, 2007).  
These inconsistencies are also likely related to the proposition that SAS® EVAAS® output 
are biased by student demographics. This was evidenced in this study, particularly for the 
teachers who taught ELLs and an inordinate number of students previously retained in grade 
(see also Newton et al., 2010; Hill et al., 2011; Rothstein, 2009). HISD teachers also mentioned 
not wanting to teach high numbers of gifted, special education, or ELL students for fear of 
posting low SAS® EVAAS® scores (Collins, in progress). In addition, the issue of SAS® EVAAS® 
bias seems to hold true for teachers of high achieving or gifted students when ceiling effects 
prevent their students’ aggregated scores from yielding significant growth (see also Wright, 
Horn, & Sanders, 1997). SAS® EVAAS® methodologists have recently verified that test ceilings are 
a concern as well, without yet providing suggestions about how to address this issue. Inversely, 
researchers have no evidence to date that regression to the mean artificially inflates value-added 
scores for teachers with large groups of low-scoring students.  
Limited evidence also exists to indicate that SAS® EVAAS® output are related to at least 
one other correlated criterion (i.e., evidence of criterion-related validity), in this case in terms of 
the PDAS (see also Milanowski et al., 2004; Wilson, Hallman, Pecheone, & Moss, 2007). It is 
methodologically and pedagogically more beneficial that a teacher be classified similarly on at least 
one other, medium-to-highly correlated, unbiased measure to independently assess the same 
construct at the same time before consequences are tied to value-added output (AERA, 2000). And 
this must happen before anyone can make a solid case that a teacher is effective or ineffective, or 
should be monetarily rewarded or contractually terminated (Baker et al., 2010; Harris, 2011; Hill, 
2009; Hill et al., 2011; Newton et al., 2010; Papay, 2010). The more that multiple indicators converge 
or correlate (e.g., in terms of inter-indicator consistency; see, for example, Amrein-Beardsley, 
Haladyna, & Polasky, 2012), and the more years over which the indicators yield the same results, the 
stronger the accountability system should be, and the more justifiable high-stakes decision(s) 
surrounding teacher evaluation should become.  
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Either way, high-stakes decisions should not be made on the basis of value-added scores 
alone (AERA, APA, & NCME, 2000). The evidence presented here indicates that, at least in the 
cases of these four teachers, HISD is violating this highly relevant standard calling for multiple 
indicators, or distorting it as principals seem to be skewing at least some teachers’ PDAS scores to 
match what appear to be the superior scores derived via SAS® EVAAS® (see also Baker, 2012; 
Garland, 2012; Ravitch, 2012).  
Whether those at SAS® EVAAS® should share in the responsibility to ensure their system is 
used properly is a debate for another day. Perhaps the focus of such conversations need to shift 
towards discussing how such system are to be used, and whom should be held responsible for 
ensuring they are used correctly and validly. While in this case it would be easy to blame the for-
profit institution netting significant returns from model sales, perhaps it is not SAS’s responsibility 
to ensure proper use of the SAS® EVAAS®. However, SAS® EVAAS ® does have the responsibility 
of identifying effective teachers, schools, and systems, in a precise, unbiased, and reliable manner 
and providing “valuable diagnostic information about [instructional] practices,” helping educators 
become more proactive and make more “sound instructional choices,” and helping teachers use 
“resources more strategically to ensure that every student has the chance to succeed” (SAS, 2012). 
These deliverables are advertised in the SAS® EVAAS® literature and marketing materials. Yet these 
claims were countered with empirical, albeit case-based evidence in this study. Researchers further 
situated these findings in the ever-evolving literature base surrounding VAMs, as well as experiences 
from other HISD teachers (Collins, in progress). 
In theory, VAMs allow for richer analyses of test score data because groups of students are 
simply followed to assess their learning trajectories from the time they enter a classroom to the time 
they leave. In practice, however, these models do not seem to work in the ways purported, and in 
this case, advertised. This was evidenced here, as researchers conducted one of the first studies to 
examine how this particular value-added system, as marketed, is working in practice. This is also the 
first study to look at this particular value-added system and its implications from the teacher’s 
perspective.  
We ultimately assert that even though results may not generalize far beyond the confines of 
this study, there is a lot to be learned, given the results presented, about the real impact of the SAS® 
EVAAS® on the very real lives of some teachers in Houston. Perhaps the methodologists pushing, 
and in this case selling the SAS® EVAAS® model for profit, are promising more than their model can 
and ever will deliver. What they are delivering, however, is also a series of unintended 
consequences, some of which are being exacerbated in HISD with its highly consequential use 
of SAS® EVAAS® output. These unintended consequences cannot continue to go unrecognized, 
and whether the unintended consequences outweigh the intended consequences warrants further 
research and evaluation.  
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